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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the .. , .. ~, ~.:r 
STATE OF UTAH ll 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPEk Cupt··-::r:·.e c.:~~-;~~~·:· 
COMPANY, et al., 
.and 
ALVIN T. LOCKE, 
Plaintiffs, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, HARSH INVESTMENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD 
J. SCHNITZER, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION AND 
BRIEF FOR REHEARING 
JOHN l\f. SHERMAN 
212 California Bank Building 
Pasadena, California 
YOUNG, THATCfiER & GLASMANN 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PACIFIC STATES CAST IRON PIPE 
COMPANY, et al., 
.and 
ALVIN T. LOCKE, 
Plaintiffs, 
Intervening Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, a cor-
poration, HARSH INVI~STMENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, and HAROLD 
J. SCHNITZER, an individual, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND 
No. 8336 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION :F,OR REHEARING 
Alvin T. Locke, intervening plaintiff and respondent 
herein, petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing 
and re-argument in the above entitled case. The petition 
is based upon the following grounds: 
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POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT 
OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951, AS CONTEMPLATING RECEIPTS 
FROM MORTGAGE BORROWING RATHER THAN THE 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM" PRICE AS 
THE SOURCE OF REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS 
EARNED IN CONNE~CTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PROJECT. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NET RENTAL 
INCOME DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD IS NOT 
TO BE INCLUDED AS REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS 
EARNED IN 'CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PROJECT. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT 
I OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING 
TO HOLD THAT THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE FOR THE 
CHANGE ORDER EXTRAS WAS $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF 
$178,672.00. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT 
II OF RESPONDENT'S ·CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING 
TO HOLD THAT APPELLANTS MAY NOT RECEIVE OUT 
OF CONSTRUCTION PROFITS TEN PERCENT (10o/0 ) OF 
THE AMOUNT OF THE BID BEFORE COMPUTING RE-
SPONDENT'S BONUS. 
'VIIEREFORE, the respondent, petitioner herein, 
prays that the judgment and opinion of the court be re-
examined and a re-argument permirtted of the entire case. 
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A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
JOHN M. SHERMAN 
and 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
By PAUL THATCHER 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
PAUL THATCHER, hereby certifies that he is one 
of the aJttorneys for the respondent, petitioner herein, and 
that in his opinion there is good cause to believe that the 
opinion is erroneous on the grounds set forth in the fol-
lowing brief and that the case ought to be re-examined 
and re-argued as prayed for in said petition. 
DATED this 13th d:ay of September, 1956. 
pAUL THATCHER 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
ARGU1IENT 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
In its opinion filed herein this Court observes that 
it has a great deal of sympathy for the trial court which 
was required to wade through a morass of per jury and 
claimed embezzlement, accus·ations and counter accusa-
tions .and recriminations. Certainly this Court deserves 
no less sympathy, as the plain duty of e~ach member re-
quires that he also wade through the same morass which 
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is now congealed into a cold record, unwanned and un-
illuminated by the personalities and manner of the ~ev­
eral p.arties and witnesses which served to highlight and 
clarify not only the trial but the evidence and the rela-
tionships of the parties. Nevertheless the members of 
this Court cannot, under their oruths as judges, escape 
that duty. ~ 
The Court will appreciate, we are sure, that ordin- .~, 
arily Respondent would not ask the Court to reconsider , 
an opinion re:ached by four of its members. However, 
this ease has, if only because of the criminal activities 
of the defendant Schnitzer and his purchased henchman, 
become something of a "cattse celebre" in the Far West, 
and not only justice, but Utah's reputation for justice 
and fair dealing is involved. Moreover, the amounts 
invohlveRd are nodt in)conTsihderRable ordunimp1ort~ntd~ att lebasdt ' to t e espon enrt . e espon ent a so IS IS ur e 4 
by the failure of the 1najority of this Court even to con-
sider, discuss or dispose of the two points e~arnestly 
raised by his Cross Appeal, a favorable ruling on either 
of which would have required the aw.arding some bonus 
to appellant Locke. Finally the Court's opinion ( evi-
dently on the theory that one 1nay "give a dog a bad name 
and hang him") gratuitously characterizes Respondent 
Locke as a ''deep reacher" .and as "probably the party 
with influence," - i.e., a "five percenter" - without any-
thing in the record to support such slurs, whereas the 
record shows that Locke throughout acted with complete 
t 
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honesty and integrity, both as to Schnitzer and the sub-
contractors. No honorable man should be expected to 
"stand still" under such circumsrtances. 
It would seem further that, in view of the difficult 
condition of the record, more weight really should have 
been given to the findings .and determination of the 
learned trial judge, who is generally recognized as one 
of the most respected, learned, prutient, careful, con-
scientious and diligent judge's in the Sta:te, with some 
20 years of judicial experience behind him. 
These considerations, with an abiding conviction that 
the majority of this Court inadvertently fell into grave 
error and did gr.ave injustice because of a misunderstand-
ing of the facts, the situation of the contra0ting parties, 
and the law and procedures relaJting to Wherry Housing 
projects impel Respondent to file this petition and brief. 
Under the circumstances it is felt thak our duty to the 
Court as well as to the Respondent would permit no less. 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT 
OF OCTOBER 4th, 1951, AS CONTEMPLATING RECEIPTS 
FROM MORTGAGE BORROWING RATHER THAN THE 
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT - "LUMP SUM" PRICE AS 
THE SOURCE OF REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS 
EARNED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PROJECT. 
A 
At the outset Respondent is c;ompelled to point out 
that the opinion of the majority of the Court is very 
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apparently based upon a completely erroneous miscon-
ception of a basic f:act. On page 2, and again on page 8 
of the opinion it is said that the agreement of 00tober 
4, 1951, was prepared by Locke's Attorney, and the Court 
accordingly construes it 1nost strictly against Locke. 
This is not the fact, and the record so shows. 
The evidence on this point is to be found on page 
52, of the transcript, and is as follows : 
"QUESTION BY MR. SHERMAN 
ANSWER BY liAROLD J. SCHNITZER 
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Schnitzer, that that par-
ticular contract dated Ooto ber 4, 1951 was 
prepared by :Mr. Frank L. Whitaker' 
A. No. I beg your pardon. It was prepared by 
Mr. Schnitzer (Louis Schnitzer, attorney) 
with Mr. Whitaker in conference, but the 
form was prepared by Mr. Schnitzer, and the 
final agreement was prepared by Mr. Schnit-
zer. 
Q. Well then, other than the preparation of the 
document itself by your cousin, JJ1 r. Louis 
Schnitzer, was it at any tilne formally 
brought to the attention of the board of di-
rectors as such of Harsh Investment Corpo-
ration' 
A. Harsh Investlnent Corporation has never, to 
my knowledge, ever had .a formal meeting 
for the particular purpose of c.onsidering the 
October 4 oonrtract with Locke. 
Q. Then the only discussion of it then was be-
tween yourself as director and Louis Schnit-
zer as a director at or about the time that 
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the contract itself was prepared. I~s that 
correct~ 
A. That's correct." 
It is clear-absolutely clear-tha,t the contracl was 
prepared not by Locke's aJttorney, but by Louis Schnitzer, 
Harold J. Schnitzer's cousin, man, and henchman, who 
even went so far as t1o aid ~and counsel with defendant 
Schnitzer by phone concerning Schnitzer's plans to com-
mit perjury in this case, as the record shows (Tr. 1024-
1026), and Locke had no more than perfunctory legal 
counsel from :Mr. Whitaker in this regard-and Whitaker 
later turned up as one of Schnitzer's Portland attorneys. 
These (contrary to the statements in the opinion) 
being the facts, it is the universal and familiar rule that 
the agreement of October 4, 1951, as well as all previous 
agreements which were prepared by Schnitzer himself, 
must be strictly construed against Schnitzer and his cor-
poration, and libe~rally construed in favor of Locke. 
17 C. J. S., "Contracts," Section 324, p. 751, states 
the general rule as follows: 
"To the extent that a contraCit is susceptible 
to two constructions by reason of doubt or un-
certainty as to the meaning of ambiguous lan-
guage, it is to be construed most strongly or 
strictly against the party by whom, or in whose 
behalf, the contract was prepared or the ambigu-
ous language was used and liberally and most 
strongly in favor of the party who is not the 
author and not responsible for the use of the lan-
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guage giving rise to the doubt and nnePrtaint~·." 
Read v. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 U. 529, 26 
P. 2d, 325; 
Jordon v. Mads en, 69 U. 112, 252 P. 570 ~ 
Penn Star Mining Co. v. Lyntan, 64 U. 343, 231 
P. 107; 
General Mills v. Cragun, 103 U. 239, 134 P. 2d 
1089; 
Gregerson v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 256 P. ~<l 
566 (Utah, 1953). 
It is obvious that the Court~ 1nisled by a misappre-
hens~on of the true fact as to the draftmanship of the 
agree·ment, followed exactly the contrary rule, construed 
the contraet strietly against Locke, as the supposed 
draftsman, and so fell into error. 
In this connection we are also constrained to call 
to the Court's attention the well e·stablished rule of law 
that where a 'trial court, after hearing all the evidence 
and considering the weight thereof and the demeanor 
of the witnesses, has entered a judgment, every pre-
sumption is indulged in favor of the correctness of the 
judgmenrt, and i~t will he presumed that the Court found 
the facts which will support the judgment if there is any 
evidence in the reeord which would support or justify 
such a finding if made. 
Lawrence v. Bamberger Railroad Company, 3 1~. 
247, 282 P. 2d 335; 
llifcCall'IJ;nt v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 241 P. 2d 468. 
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B 
Let us turn now to the core of this controversy; 
the construction of the agreement of Octo her 4, 1951. As 
the Court in its opinion very properly observed, thre 
basic disagreement between the parties goes to the 
measurement of construction profit, and, more specifi-
eallv what construct~on income was contemplated and 
. ' 
intended by them to be used as the basis for computing 
such profits, or (even more specifically) whe1ther the 
parties really intended that for such purpose the money 
borrowed by the Owner from Irving Trust Company 
should be deemed the only n1oney "earned" in connec-
tion with the construction, or whether they intended that 
the agreed contract price to be paid under the con-
struction contraci - "lump sum" as supplemented by 
the "Change Orders" for extra work should be deemed 
to be the money "earned" in connection with the con-
struction. 
The learned trial judge after hearing many days 
of testimony and argument, and after patient, careful 
and conscientious consideration, properly construed the 
contract and found that the parties intended the contract 
price under the construction contract should be the basis 
for computing construction profits earned. This Court, 
erroneously construing the contract strictly against 
Locke, concluded that the parties intended that the money 
borrowed was intended to be the sole earnings for com-
puting construction profit. 
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In this case the evidence is clear that Schnitzer and 
his Attorney drew the October 4th agreement, and the 
trial court obviously and properly proceeded on that 
basis to construe the contract strictly against him and 
liber.ally for Locke. Accordingly this Court should not 
upset the trial court's findings and conclusions unles·s 
they are clearly contrary to the manifest weight of the 
evidence or the law, which is certainly not the case here. 
See Respondent's brief, page 100, and cases there cited. 
See also: 
Zuniga v. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 48 P. 2d 513; 
Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U. 520, 94 P. 2d 465; 
Olivero v. Eleganti, 61 Urtah 475, 214 P. 313; 
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177; 
Bennett v. Bowen, 65 Ut·ah 444, 238 P. 240. 
Although the Oourt's opinion in several places re-
fers to the "plain, unmnbiguous terms of the contract," 
it is abundantly clear that the contract is neither plain 
nor unambiguous in this reg;ard. In the first place not 
only did Respondent and his counsel, but also the learned 
Chief Justice and the learned trial judge have ooncluded 
that the n1e1aning of the contract is contrary to that as-
signed by the majority. In -the second place, even the 
majority have found it necess:ary in their opinion to rely 
(mistakenly as has been shown) upon the asrsumed f~act 
that Locke's attorney drew the document, and also upon 
the background and previous dealings of the parties in 
order to arrive at a conclusion as to meaning and intent. 
(And here again the majority nlisapprehended the na-
ture and significance of such background and dealings.) 
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And in the third place, the contract provides for payment 
of a bonus to Locke based on "profit earned by Harsh 
in connection with" construction, without supplying any 
defin~tion of the difficult and broad term "profit" nor 
any definition of or formula for computing or establish-
ing the basic components of any profit. Considering that 
by October 4, 1951, both partie1s had acquired a thorough 
knowledge of the requirements and procedures for this 
Wherry project, and of the various possible sources of 
both income and expense which each of the several cor-
porations and persons necessarily involved would have, 
it is clear that the words used in this situation are most 
1tnclear-and muslt be construed strictly against Schnit-
zer, and any doubts as to meaning resolved ag.ainst him, 
as he and his attorney drew the docmnent and foisted it 
off on Locke, the builder. It must be remembered too 
thak Schnitzer was a millionaire financier, accustomed 
to problems of income, expense, profit and loss, and 
juggling of profits and funds to s:ave taxes, while Locke 
was a builder, ·without riches, and unaccustomed to the 
fast foot-work which was Schnitzer's way-of-life in these 
matters. All tlris must be inferred and assmned in sup-
port of the lower court's judgment, in accord with the 
principles referred to above. 
B.l) 
Actually, the contraet itself is so inartificially drawn 
that it gives few clues as to speeific meaning on the points 
in issue. Considering the brilliant intellectual ability 
of Schni1tzer, which was apparent to all who participated 
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in the trial below, and the character (or rather, lark 
of it) of Schnitzer and of his henchmen and feudal 
retainers, as that was developed and disclosed at the 
trial-considering all this in the light of the fact that 
Schnitzer and his cousin-,attorney carefully prepared the 
document, the Court would be entirely justified in infer-
ring that Schnitzer intended the contract as a bated hook 
on which to crutch the unwary Locke, playing him if 
necessary through financially exhausting litigation to 
the shallows of bankruptcy where Loeke could be forced 
to capitulate and leave Schnitze,r the sole owner of a 
prope,rty costing Schnitzer nothing, but worth millions. 
However, the contract does present, within its four 
corners, several cogent clues as to the intention of the 
parties. 
First, the contract provides a bonus to be paid out 
of "net profit earned by Harsh in connection with the 
construction of the .aforesaid projects." The term used 
is "earned". Earnings come either from pay for services 
rendered or from buying low and selling high. It is in 
the very nature of things-it is inherent in the Ine·aning 
and concept of the term-that earnings, or earned profit, 
cannot arise in any other way. Now, money borrowed 
is not, and never can be, money earned. vV e repeat: 
money borrowed can never be money earned. The mean-
ings of the two words, the fundamental concepts ex-
pressed by e,ach, are totally and absolutely different. 
We challenge the Court to find one dictionary, or even 
one man on the street, who will say that money borrowed 
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is the same as rnoney earned. The·se are no·t mere tech-
nical niceties of accounting terminology; they .are funda-
mental to the accepted meaning of the English language 
and to the facts of business life. 
We are sure thwt no lawyer, and no judge who has 
ever been compelled to borrow money has ever, for tax 
purposes, reported the money received either as "earned 
income" or as "e:arned profit." We are equally sure 
thaJt if any busy income tax agent had ever suggested 
that the money received on the loan was "e·arned profit" 
and taxable as such, the outraged protests of that lawyer, 
and of that judge, would still be echoing in the judicial 
halls. :Money borrowed is not money earned! 
Axiomatically, earned profit can come ONLY out of 
earned money, and not out of borrowed money. No 
matter how ignorant this millionaire and his attorney 
were on October 4th, 1951, they knew that much! And 
knowing that much, they chose to promise Locke a bonus 
out of "profits earned." They knew bertter than to use 
"earned" for "borrowed." Clearly they contemplated 
and intended some legal arrangement by which Harsh 
Investment Corporation would earn money, and probably 
even earn a money profit in connection with the con-
struction of the project. This necessarily and absolutely 
negatives .any purpose or intent to treat the money 
borrowed by Harsh Utah Corporation (the Owner Corp-
oration) as money earned by Harsh Investment Corp-
oration (the Sponsor and Building Contractor). Such 
a conclusion violates-nay, it ravages- the plain and 
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universally .accepted meaning of the terms used. And 
re·member, this contract must be construed most strictly 
against Schnitzer, its instigator and draftsman. 
But, says the Court's opinion, "any profit to be 
figured . . . under this contract . . . . must be figured 
upon a profit calculated to the owner-sponsor-manager 
corporation and not to the construction corporation." 
(Opinion, P. 7.) How can this be? The owner corporation 
(Harsh Utah) was the rnartager and the borrower, but 
was not, and under F. H. A. requirements oould not l~P 
the sponsor or the construction corporation. The sponsor 
corporation (H:arsh Inve~stmenrt Corporation) was also 
the construction corporation, but was not and under 
F. H. A. requirements, it could not be the owner or the 
borrower. :Moreover, on October 4th, 1951, Harsh Utah, 
the owner-manager, was not ye~t in existence, and was 
not a party to the contract. With all submission, it is 
utterly unreasonable to suppose that these parties on 
October 4th, 1951, intended to contract for a bonus based 
on money to be borrowed by another corporation not 
yet in existence, which borrowed money would have to 
be repaid with interest, and part of which 1noney to be 
borrowed by the future corporation, they styled "profit 
earned by Harsh," the contracting corporation! This 
is reductio ad absurdam! 
One of the most elen1entary rules of construction 
of contracts is that it must be presumed that the parties 
intended their .agreement and each clause thereof to have 
some legal effect. Therefore the parties must be pre-
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sumed to have contemplated some arrangement by which 
Harsh Investment Corpo~ation, the contracting party, 
might earn a profit out of which (if large enough), Locke 
would be paid a bonus. That much surely must be con-
ceded by all. And yet under the construction adopted 
by the Court neither corporation could possibly earn a 
profit out of which the bonus could be paid; the contract 
is utterly and completely meaningle,ss when so construed, 
and could not become operative under any circumstances. 
Consider the situation. The opinion says, in effect, 
thaJt the agreed compensation to the builder, Harsh 
Investment Corporation, under the Construction Con-
tract-"Lump Sum" must be disregarded, and, .although 
executed, is meaningless and irrevelant to these issues; 
the opinion s·ays that the parties did not intend the con-
tract price to ~e a basis on which construction profits to 
this corporation can be computed; the owner need not pay 
the contractor the agreed price even though the work is 
done. (Opinion, Pp. 6 and 7.) But this is the only pos-
sible source of construction revenue or profit to Harsh 
Investment. Therefore, H.arsh Investment cannot pos-
sibly earn any profit out of which to pay Locke the bonus 
it solemnly agreed to pay him out of construction profits. 
In other words, the opinion says the parties agreed and 
intended that Locke should be paid a bdnus out of a 
profit which the parties knew and intended could not 
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and should not be the source of the bonus-a manifestl~· 
absurd ,and internally inconsis,tent interpretation, and 
one which the parties simply could not have intended. 
Consider the other phase of the contract as con-
strued by the Court: The profit contemplated (says 
the opinion) was the exces·s of the amount borrowed 
by the owner (Harsh U t~ah) over the actual costs of 
construction incurred by the sister contrackor corporation 
(Harsh Inve·stment). \Vhen stated thus, simply and 
baldly, it would seem that this interpretation 1nust fall 
of its own weight. IIow could any business man, no 
matter how ignorant or gullible, intend so to contract? 
Obviously, no profit could ever be realized and no bonus 
ever paid under such a contract, (and it must be pre-
sumed that they intended something by their contract). 
The Court in its computations overlooked in the maze 
of figures and evidence a fundamental fact which no 
borrower is ever allowed by the lender to forget: Bor-
rowed money must be repaid. 
That is what the accountants were talking about 
when they testified that 1nortgage proceeds are never 
income on which a profit can be based-there is always 
that offsetting obligation to repay. 
Suppose, for argument, that Schnitzer had proposed 
such an agreement to Locke and the latter had sat down 
with a pencil to figure his probable bonus under that 
"he.ads I win, tails you lose" supposition. His notes 
would have come up like this: 
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"HARSH UTAI-I CONSTRUCTION PROFIT" 
Income: 
(a) Mortgage Receipts ------$ 
Less : Repayment of 
Principal --------------------
Net Income from 
Mortgage -------------------
(b) Mortgage proceeds on 
change orders ----------
Less: Repayment ---------
2,636,800.00 
2,636,800.00 
178,672.00 
178,672.00 
Net Income, Mortgage, based 
on change orders -----· 
(c) Rental Income ---------------
Total Net Income ----------
Expenses: 
(a) Direct construction 
expense ------------------------------$2,656,457.21 
(b) Indirect construction 
expense ------------------------------ 45,631.34 
Nothing 
Nothing 
$ 165,986.49 
$ 165,986.49 
(c) Additional construction 
expense ------------------------------ 69,5"97 .31 $2,771,685.86 
Inevitable (and terrific loss) ___ _ -$2,605,699.37 
And, if rental income is rejected, the inevitable 
construction loss to the owner under this construction 
of the contract is always exactly equal to the cost of 
construction. No prof:' is possible and hence no bonus 
would be possible. rrhis is utterly inconceivable and 
manifestly absurd. Locke may be a fool, but Schnitzer 
is smart enough to know Locke would not fall for any 
such shell game. Neither intended any such inherently 
abortive and absurd arrangement. 
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What, then, did these parties intend~ They intended 
a very simple and business-like arrangement: 
First, Locke, having held under their previous agree-
ment a half-interest in both the construction and owner-
ship phases of the three projects, surrendered to Schnit-
zer his half interest in the ownership ph;ag,e only. 
Second, Schnitzer's "finance fee" for financing the 
project was incre·ased from the previous 10% of the 
amount of the 1nortgage to 10% of the amount of the bids 
submitted on the project, an increase in this finance 
fee of $13,020.00. 
Third, by this time it was known that Harsh Invest-
ment was low bidder on three projects mentioned in the 
agreement which would cost nine or ten million dollars 
to construct, and that the projects would probably be 
aw.arded to Harsh (Tr. 324, 87 4-875, 880-881, 34M-40I\I, 
199M-200M, 786-788). If Locke was to retire as an owner 
from the joint venture, and therefore would not direct 
construction as .an owner, who would direet it and in what 
capacity? Ce·rtainly not financier Schnitzer. Locke was 
the only one in sight, and it was necessary to Schnitzer 
that he be tied up to oorry through construction. There-
fore Locke was retained as gener:al construction super-
intendent on all three projects at $1,000 per month. 
Locke thus acquired the doubtful privilege of working 
his head off and his heart out carrying the responsibility 
for what then appeared to be $10,000,000 worth of con-
struction in three widely scattered states. If anyone 
ever expected to earn, and did earn his ·wage twice over, 
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Locke did. This was no "position"-this was a "job." 
Locke earned every penny of his sal,ary by the sweat 
of his brow-not by the surrender of his half-interest 
in the rentals a£ter the construction period as the Court 
intimates in its opinion. It is probable that no other 
competent construction n1an would have assumed those 
responsibilities for twice the salary, and Locke would 
not have done so except that he had a stake in the con-
struction profits which he could protect and enhance by 
making sure that the construction was accomplished 
with the utmos1t efficiency and econ01ny. 
Finally, Locke, having ce:ased to be a co-owner, and 
having become an employee of the construction contrac-
tor, it was necessary to provide for payment to him of 
his retained share of the construction profits after pay-
ment of Schnitzer's "finance fee." The simple and 
obvious way to do this was to provide that the contractor 
pay him, as superintendent, a bonus equal to one-half 
of the construction profits after payment of Schnitzer's 
finance fee. This was the agreement signed. 
Obviously, it was intended then that the sponsor 
corporation, Harsh Investment Corporation, would be-
come the prime contractor for the construction of the 
projects. The contract (prepared by Schnitzer, not Locke, 
may we remind the Court) provided that the bonus 
should be paid out of the "profit earned by Harsh in 
connection with the construction" as heretofore pointed 
out. Moreover, it is further provided that these pro-
visions as to computing the bonus would apply "in the 
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event the constnwtion work 1s handled in any other 
manner than contracting the entire job on any or all of 
said projects as hereinafter set forth." In other words, 
it was intended that, with the exception noted, auy con-
struction contract made would be on such terms that 
Harsh could 1nake a constt·uction profit, and Locke could 
share therein. Schnitzer and his corporation thereunto 
plighted their troth, and Locke (who could estin1ate con-
struction costs, but could not foresee that Schnitzer would 
shortly become .a confessed perjurer and defrauder) 
believed and trusted them. 
Schnitzer's then intention to con1pute income and 
profit on the basis of the construction contract price 
is cle:arly shown by the fact that when work was started 
on the first ( 1tiontana) project, pursuant to the contract, 
the books pertaining thereto were set up to reflect income 
based on construction contract payments, and only later 
did he cause these entries to be changed-apparently for 
tax purposes ( T. 459-551; Respondent's original brief, 
appendix pp. 1 to 3). 
B.2) 
The next cogent clue given by the contract itself 
as to the true intent of the parties is: Schnitzer and his 
attorney chose to promise a bonus out of the Harsh 
Investment's earnings "in connection with the construc-
tion" of the projects, not in connection with the financing 
of the projects. The view adopted by the court's opinion, 
that borrowed money was the intended basis of the 
earned profit neces'Sarily and obviously can be true only 
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if the profit intended was one to be realized out of fi-
nancing, for the borrowing of money is a. financing, not a. 
construction operation. The money borrowed could not 
possibly be said to be "earned in connection with the 
construction" - the consideration for the loan was the 
promise to repay with interest-not the construction of 
the houses. On the other hand, the consideration for the 
construction of the houses (as specified in all the relevant 
exhibits) was the "lump sum" contract price-not the 
loan of the 1noney, and conversely, the consider.ation for 
payment of the "lump-sum" contract price was the con-
struction of the houses by the contractor - not the 
owner's promise to repay. Only the "lump-sum" contract 
price can truthfully or logically be said to be "earned in 
connection with the construction" as specified in the 
contract. 
Everything: the October 4th contract itself, the con-
struction contract, the note and mortgage, the VVherry 
Housing law and regulations, the testimony of the ex-
pert auditors, accepted business practice, the testimony 
of Locke, the stipulation and background of the parties, 
and the learned trial judge's findings-everything, that 
is, except the lying testimony and lying records belatedly 
prepared at the direction of the confessed perjurer 
Schnitzer-requires that this court affirm the trial court's 
finding that the "lump-sum" eontr.act was intended to 
be the basis for computing "profits earned in connection 
with the construction." 
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c. 
It is neeessary also to say something about the clause 
of the October ±, 1951, agreement to the effect that, if 
none of the Schnitzer interests should do the construction 
work, and "if Harsh should elect to enter into any agree-
ment with any other finn, person or corporation to per-
form the entire constntction work on any or all of said 
projects on the basis of a guaranteed profit to Harsh" 
then Locke should receive certain salary for services re-
quired plus 10% of Harsh's "guaranteed profit." 
In the Court below, in the original briefs and at the 
oral argument this provision was tacitly or expressly 
conceded to be inapplicable to the facts as they developed, 
and was not explained or argued. Therefore, until this 
Court picked it up and used it as a basis for its inter-
pretation of the applicable portion of the agreement no 
analysis was deemed necessary in an already extensive 
brief. However-
In the Court's opinion it is argued that this supports 
the conclusion that the partie's, notwithstanding their 
clear references to "profits earned," really expected to 
pay a bonus out of money borrowed from Irving Trust 
Company (which the opinion identifies with the Govern-
Inent) and that they considered they would receive profit 
out of the borrowed money. But when this is considered 
in the light of customary practices and procedures in 
financing and contracting the construction of building 
projects of all kinds, it gives no support to any such 
strained construction. On the contrary. 
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It is such a general practice and custom in finan-
cial and building .circles to use the arrangement contem-
plated that the Court probably, upon refreshing its 
judicial recollection, will take judicial notice thereof. If 
not, we submit it is the Court's clear duty under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and in the interests of justice 
to return the cruse to the trial court for the taking of 
further evidence before depriving Locke of his legal 
rights and moneys because of a misapprehension arising 
for the first time in this Court. As it now stands, we 
have no choice but to present in this brief the custom 
and procedures contemplated by the clause which 
troubled the Court. 
What they had in mind was, simply, the very common 
practice of a prime contractor subcontracting the entire 
job for 'a price less than the original contract price, thus 
assuring the prime contractor a guaranteed profit equal 
to the difference between the prime contract price and 
the sub-contract price. For example, if in this case, 
Harsh Investment Corporation, having received from 
the owner, Harsh Utah Corporation, the contract to build 
the Hill Field Air Force Base Project for $2,995,205, 
had immediately sub-contracted the entire job to Vitt 
Construction Company, who agreed to build the project 
for $2,600,000, this clause would have become oper-
ative. Vitt being so obligated by contract backed by a 
surety performance bond to do the work for the lesser 
figure, Harsh is, in effect, "guaranteed" a profit of 
$395,205 on the transaction. 
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All the prime 0ontractor, Harsh, would have to do 
would be to watch Vitt to 1nake sure it and its surety 
perfonned as agreed. For this it would need the services 
of .an expert construction man as an "inspector" whose 
function would be "to supervise the construction-to 
ascertain that said projeets are performed in accordance 
with the plans and spec·ifications AGREED TO BY 
HARSFI, and Locke shall devote his full time and atten-
tion in connection therewith," as provided in this clause 
of the contract. This was to have been Locke's role if 
Harsh had so sub-contracted the entire job in one piece. 
It is too clear f.or argument that unless Harsh sub-
contracted the construction of the entire project as indi-
cated the p.arties would not be concerned with the quoted 
provision. No "guaranteed profit" to Harsh could then 
arise in connection with construction. 
If the Court will re-read the contract in the light 
of this pra0tice understood by the parties, it will be very 
clear indeed that all parties intended that the sponsor, 
Harsh Investment Corporation, should in any event be 
the prime contractor also, and that if Harsh subcon-
tracted the entire job to .an outside-r, Locke would get 
a bonus of 10% of the difference (or "guaranteed 
profit") while if the project was constructed by IIarsh in 
any other manner (i.e., directly, or by "employing" 
Schnitzer, or by piecemeal subcontracting), then Locke 
would get a bonus equal to 50% of I-Iarsh's net con-
struction profit computed after deduction of the 10% 
"finance fee" to be paid Schnitzer for financing the 
construction of the project. Such "\V.as the simple, bus-
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inesslike and effective agreement made by the parties 
-drawn by Schnitzer, and then approved and signed 
by Locke. Under that agreement the basis of the profits 
·was, and must have been contemplated as being the 
price to be paid H.arsh under the "Construction Contract-
Lump Sum" which the parties shortly thereafter did 
in fact oause to be executed between the Owner Corpor-
ation ancl Harsh, and which they both knew would have 
to be executed under requirements of F. H. A. and the 
financing institution. 
D 
Although the Court's opinion refers to the agree-
ment of October 4th as "clear and unan1biguous," it 
finds it necessary to refer to the background .and history 
of the parties, their previous dealings and the mistaken 
assumption that the agreement was drawn by Locke in 
order to arrive at the conclusion that they intended 
''money borrowed)) to be '·money earned.)) vVith all due 
submission, in the interests of justice it must be said 
that the Court's opinion evidences a 1nisunderst.anding 
and misconstruction of this background, history and pre-
vious dealings as shown by the evidence. 
While it is true that at the outset, in June of 1951, 
Locke alone was familiar with Wherry Housing pro-
cedures and requirements, by October 4th, Schnitzer 
had applied his very superior, if amoral, intelligence 
to the problem, had studied, .and was thoroughly familiar 
with the entire set up. He had worked with Locke in 
preparing and submitting bids on several projects, and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
knew from beginning to end all of the requiren1enb.; 
and all of the possible alte~rnative procedure'S, as is 
well evidenced by the alternative provisions of the con-
t:vact, which he testified he himself drafted before it 
was polished by his cousin-attorney. 
Moreover, he had, even prior to the agreement of 
August 29, 1951, hired the Portland attorney W~alter 
E. Hutchinson, who was an expert in, and limited his 
practice exclusively to the legal aspects of Wherry 
Housing projects. He aided Schnitzer and Locke setting 
up the entire program; he computed the amount of the 
compensation fixed in the lump-sum construction con-
tract and prepared the contract itself as the attorney 
for Schnitzer's interests; and was Schnitzer's advisor 
and man thenceforth, even to the extent that he, a lawyer, 
admittedly committed perjury in the course of the trial 
at Schnitzer's behest (T. 810-812). 
Hutchinson, Schnitzer's man, knew, and before Oct-
ober 4, 1951, Schnitzer knew, (1) that I-Iarsh Investment 
Corpor.ation, the Sponsor, could not, under F. H. A. 
requirements w0t also as Owner, and a sepa!'late Owner 
corporation would have to be organized under Utah 
law (Administrative Rules and Regulations for Military 
Housing Insurance under Title VIII of the National 
Housing Act, Sections IV, 4.(a) and V, 4); (2) that the 
Owner corporation would, under F. H. A. and lender's 
requirement, have to enter into a "lump-sum" construc-
tion contract for the projects with a legally sep·arate 
corporation bonded by surety company to complete the 
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projeds for the stipulated price which was required to 
be paid to the contractor, as Hutchinson testified (T. 
333-344; 829-832; 335-337; 1115-1116); (3) that while 
a limited profit might be earned by the construction 
contr.actor-whether speculative or guaranteed by sub-
contract-the principal profit which the facts and the 
Wherry Housing Act praetieally guaranteed was to 
be derived from rentals over a 75 year tenn, which were 
income-tax free for the first 33 years; ( ±) that the money 
borrmrcd from Irving Trust Co. for construction would 
have to be repaid or these rental profits would be lost 
by mortgage foreclosure; (5) that Schnitzer, as a million-
aire, would tax-wise get least out of earned profit, and 
profit most out of tax free, long term rental income, 
while Locke's earned income would fall in a lower tax 
bracket and he needed quick profits for a s·take for his 
future; (6) that F. H. A. required the Owner-1\t!ortgagor 
(not the Sponsor or the Contractor) to secure completion 
of the project by depositing in escrow c.ash or U.S. 
securities equal to 10o/o of the estimated project replace-
ment cost (the owner's required "10% equity"), which 
funds F. H. A. and Irving Trust Co. required to be 
expended for work and material on the physical improve-
ments prior to the advance of any mortgage money 
(Exhibit 228, "Invitation," paragraphs 7 and 8; Reg-
ulations, Section Y 2; T. 1117-1121); (7) that H.arsh 
Investment Corporation, the Sponsor, would also be 
the prime construction contractor to e~arn what con-
struction profits were available in the projects, which 
had b~en estimated and bid (see the Contract as analyzed, 
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supra, and subsequent behavior of the parties thereunder 
before Schnitzer's greed evoked his larcenous tendencies 
against his erstwhile friend and collaborator, Locke); (8) 
that Locke, under the August 29th agreement, then owned 
a half interest in both the construction and ownership-
rental phases of all three projects bid (August 29th 
agreement, quoted in opinion); and (9) finally, that 
Locke's construction know-how and experience were 
essential to Schnitzer in the building of the projects 
(Court Opinion, recognizing that Schnitzer had limited 
construction knowledge). 
All these facts and the knowledge of both parties 
thereof either appear clearly from the evidence received 
by the trial court, or the trial court was entitled to infer 
and find from evidence received. The careful, c;onscien-
tious, le.arned and experienced trial court obviously 
did so, for it construed the contract and found the in-
tention of the parties in accord with the obvious require-
nlents thereof, and as Locke has always contended. 
It is the law that where the trial court has entered 
a judgment, this Court will presume every finding and 
inference of fact necessary to support the judgment 
which the record will in any way support, even though 
such finding is not specifically made and entered by the 
trial court, and findings will be implied or supplied if 
neeessary. 
5 C. J. 8. "Appeal and Error" Seetion 1564h, pp. 
418 et seq.; 
Ibid. section 1566 ; 
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Baird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 
Pac. 1060 (Syll. 14) 
Thus, while it is true, as the Court's opinion states, 
that the law is that "an integrated contract cannot be 
varied by parol evidence" (emphasis added), we are not 
dealing here with an integrated contract specifying that 
Locke shall be paid a bonus out of "excess money 
borrowed by the Owner in connection with the construc-
tion;" we are dealing with a contract specifying that 
Locke shall be paid a bonus out of "profits earned by 
Harsh in connection with the construction." As the 
Contract does not speeify the formula for computing 
the "profit earned by Harsh," the trial court very prop-
erly received evidence and made its findings on the in-
tention of the parties in order to fill in this hiatus. The 
Court's findings and judgment .are amply supported 
in the record, and hence with all due submission, should 
not have been upset here. See the authorities cited on 
pages 100-101 of Respondent's original brief herein. 
And if this Contract is to be regarded as an inte-
grated contract, not to be varied by parol evidence, the 
judgment of the Court below is eminently correct on 
this point, and should be affirmed as giving effect to 
the Contr.act as written, by computing "profits earned 
by Harsh in connection with the construction" in accord 
with the accepted usual and ordinary meaning of these 
words m their everyday usage by ordinary business 
men. 
With all due submission, to construe the words 
"profits earned by Harsh" (which, under law, could not 
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be the Owner) as meaning "Excess rnoney vorrozced anu 
to be repaid by the Owner," .as is done in the opinion 
herein, is for the Court cornpletely to re-write the Con-
tract made by the parties, so that it becomes completely 
meaningless and impossible to execute, as has been here-
in demonstrated. This "re-write job" also does grave 
injustice to Locke, whose actions, honor and integrity 
are uni1npeached on this record outside of the testimony 
of the admitted perjurer and defr.auder Schnitzer. 
We think the Court should be reminded, in the 
interests of common justice, that Locke was no "deep-
reacher." He was a man with an idea for the earning 
of an honest profit in a lawful way, and who was unfor-
tunate enough to fall in with a well-heeled thief (to use 
the applicable, plain term) and not to discover Schnitzer's 
true character until it was too late. This could happen 
to anyone, and should not be used by the Court to stig-
matize Locke's name on the public record or to deprive 
him of the rightful proceeds of his idea, skill and toil. 
In this connection we think our duty requires that 
we remind the Court that it was largely on the basis 
of Loeke's testimony that the lower Court was able to 
circumvent Schnitzer's schemes to defraud the sub-
contractors Moulding, Waterfall, et al, out of their 
compensation, and to enter judgments in their favor in 
excess of $246,378.58. Locke did this even though it 
was then apparent that every dollar ordered paid to a 
sub-contractor cost Locke personally the sum of fifty 
cents. His testimony for the sub-contractors cost him 
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$123,000.00 in round figures. Is this the act of a "deep-
reacher"-the act of a co-conspirator to defraud both 
the Government and the Utah sub-contr.a.ctors ~ The 
answer is obvious : No ! It is the act of an honest man 
and fellow victim who had walked unknowingly into 
Schnitzer's snares-a man entitled to justice. 
In its opinion the Court comn1ents that the prospect 
of rental profits from the project were "remote, spec-
ulative, and highly uncertain," and intimates that in 
October of 1951 Locke was and should have been happy, 
even anxious, to surrender a half interest therein in 
return for a $1000 per month salary during the con-
struction period. In assuming this position the Court 
overlooks several most important facts be.aring on 
Locke's attitude and the intention of the parties. In 
the first place it then appeared that Locke, for this 
salary, would have to direct and have full direct re,spon-
sibility for the construction of 3 widely separ.ated and 
difficult rush projects costing nine or ten million dollars 
to build, while reporting to and coordinating with 
Schnitzer at the headquarters in Portland, Oregon. He 
was going to earn that salary, or even double that 
amount, with labor, sweat and tears, and both parties 
knew it. He didn't have to "buy" the salary twice, and 
Schnitzer had to hai'C a co11.'-druction superinte11drnt. 
In the second place, in October, 1951 the rentals looked 
like the surest investment as well as the tax-free phase 
of the profit, whi0h would continue over a lifetime. 
The Government had certified, and the p.arties knew, 
that there was a critical shortage of housing in the areas 
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involved. From Wherry Housing procedures and rules 
and the terms of the "Invitation" to bid on the project 
(Exhibit 228, paragraph 6) they knew that rentals 
would be fixed so as to bring 6¥2% per annum on the 
difference between the mortgage and the estin1ated rr-
placement cost on a 93o/o occupancy factor, (a chart of 
which is set forth hereafter), with rentals to be adjusted 
upward to bring the s~ame return if the occupancy factor 
fell below 93%. Previously constructed Wherry projects 
were (and continue to be) phenominally successful. 
Schnitzer was only required to put up certain escrow 
funds, while Locke was not required to put up any money, 
and the remaining 90% could be borrowed with an 
F. H. A. guaranty .at an annual intererst which could 
not exceed 4% per annum. So, as it appeared to these 
joint venturers in 1951, Locke, for his idea and services 
in preparing bids, and making e·stimates, etc., owned 
a half int1erest in probable construction profits and in 
the .apparently "brass-bound cinch" tax-free rental profits 
over a lifetime~a life pension. 
Actually, as shown by Exhibit 4.43, tendered by de-
fendants, the ultimately approved replacen1ent cost of 
the Hill Field project alone, was $3,547,860.00, while 
the mortgage was $2, 791,200.00, leaving an Owner's equity 
at the outset of $756,660.00. 
For the purpose of illustration of what was con-
' . 
templated, we have set out in Appendix I a computation 
of tax-free rental incmne fran~ the Hill Field project 
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alone, prepared on the basis of these figures and Govern-
ment regulations for the first 10-year period. 
From that computation it is apparent that Locke 
(an optimistic builder) very probably considered he had 
prior to October -t, 1951, a half interest in probable con-
struction profits of more than $181,000 (the bid had been 
raised after the computation shown in Exhibit 222, appel-
lant's brief, Appendix 36) plus tax-free rental profit 
for the first 10 of 75 years amounting to $375,985 as a 
minimum, less Schnitzer's finance fee - .and all this in 
return for that great basis of American business: a sound 
idea with know-how, all without having to risk a dime of 
capital. And this is only one of three projects which 
would go on for 75 years! 
It is thus apparent that Locke (an optimistic builder) 
considered he had prior to October 4, 1951, a half interest 
in probable construction profits of more than $181,000 
(the bid had been raised after the computation shown 
in Exhibit 22, appelant's brief, Appendix 36) plus tax-
free rental profit for the first 10 of 75 years amounting 
to $375,985 as a minimum, less Schnitzer's finance fe:e 
-and all this in return for that great basis of American 
business: .a sound idea with know-how, and without 
having to risk a dime of capital. And this is only one of 
three projects which would go on for 75 years! 
"\V e respectfully submit to the Court that it is in-
conceivable that Locke intended to exchange this project 
for a tough, hard construction job, at bare wages for an 
experienced General Construction 'Superintendent and 
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Builder, especially when such men were being offered 
employment anywhere at premium prices at the time, as 
the Court judicially knows. Indeed, such skills still 
demand a premium. 
It is equally inconceiv:able that Schnitzer, in drafting 
the new contract could have thought he could get Locke 
to give up this kind of a prospect for a mere job plus the 
absolutely impossible prospeet o.f a bonus to be paid out 
of the profits of borrowed money, all of which had to be 
repaid under the law. Never did Locke appear that 
gullible. No, as the Contract says, the parties intended 
Locke to get a bonus out of "profits earned by Harsh" 
in the performance of a constru0tion contract for the 
contemplated and required Owner corporation, which 
could only be based on the lump-sum contract price. 
I-Iarsh had, and could expect no income from any other 
source. 
\Vhen the parties met in 1951, Schnitzer, although 
still in his twenties, was already a millionaire. This is 
not accomplished without a sharp nose for a good busi-
ness proposition, and it is obvious that in Wherry Hous-
ing he instantly recognized one. That he was not mis-
taken is well proven by the history of such projects gen-
erally, and particularly by the section on Wherry Hous-
ing contained in Report No. 1890 of the 84th Congress, 
2nd Session, House of Representatives, entitled "Au-
thorizing Construction; Construction for the IJ!ilitary 
Departments." An excerpt therefr01n is printed 1n Ap-
pendix II hereof. It is there shown that the average 
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Wherry Unit cost less than $9000 to build, arrd will bring 
.an annual rental of $1080, or $81,000 over the term of a 
75 year lease. This of course was based on 100% occu-
pancy, whereas the projects were designed to return 
61j2 o/o of cost ·on 93% occupancy. The Hill Field rentals 
over the term will gross $23,898,000 based on 93% occu-
pancy, or $25,575,000 based on 100% occupancy. And 
these rentals will be paid out of housing allowances to 
Government military personnel. 
No wonder the Committee recommended that the 
Government acquire these projects for the replacement 
cost, in this case, $3,547,860. 
Since then, in the National Housing Act of 1956, Sec-
tion 512, printed in Appendix III hereof, the Congress 
has authorized the purchase of such projects for the esti-
mated replacement cost less depreciation (which, by regu-
lation, is on a 50 year base, or 2% per annum). The 
project was not certified as complete until January, 1955, 
so, as the mortgage amortizes (over 331j3 years,) more 
rapidly than the property depreciates, Schnitzer's equity 
should be worth more now in cash than the $756,660 it 
was worth at completion. And at cmnpletion Schnitzer 
had already withdrawn more than he had advanced on 
the project: he didn't, and doesn't, have a penny of his 
own invested. 
That's not so had, on another man's idea and know-
how! Schnitzer will still have a tremendous profit, even 
if he is required to pay Locke what he owes him. It's not 
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so inconceivable that he should agree to pay Locke a 
bonus for such an idea plus know-how. 
The Court also conunents in effect that the parties 
could not have intended to base a bonus on .an unascer-
tained and highly arbitrary amount of a contract between 
two wholly owned Schnitzer corporations, which he could 
have set at a figure so low as to insure no profit at all. 
The answer to this is twofold. First, Locke had not then 
discovered Schnitzer's true character, and obviously 
trusted and was entitled to trust hi1n to do the right, 
proper and fair thing as conte1nplated. Second and more 
important, perhaps, both had been working with the ex-
pert Hutchinson, and both knew that if the contract price 
was set unreasonably low Harsh could not get a perform-
ance bond as required by law and regulation, and Schnit-
zer, who was already having difficulty (according to his 
statements to Locke) in raising the money for the 
"additional cash requirements over the mortgage owner's 
equity," would have to raise and escrow substantial 
additional funds .to insure the completion of the contract, 
as I-Iutchinson testified before the trial court. This gave 
assurance that the contract price (which Hutchinson 
computed from F. H. A. considerations .and require-
ments) would be as contemplated, and on th81t basis 
Locke knew he could oause Harsh to do the work ~at a. 
profit which would assure him a substantial bonus. See 
the Regulations, Section V 5, and Hutchinson's testimony 
before the trial Court (T. 339-342; 829-833) as set out 
in Respondent's original brief, Appendix, pp. 4 to 7 .and 
16 to 21. 
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In the light of this situation it is inconceivable that 
Locke, in signing an agre·ement for a bonus to be paid 
out of "profit e~arned by Harsh" renlly intended his bonus 
to come, as the Court suggests, from "surplus moneys 
borrowed by the owner," which would have to be repaid 
to the lender before Schnitzer could get any tax-free 
rental profits. It is equally inconceivable that Schnitzer 
really intended any such result or contract; and again, 
Schnitzer's contract must be construed most strictly 
aqainst him. 
The intention attributed to the parties by the Court 
necessarily presupposes and presumes a presently formed 
conspiracy between the parties to defr.aud the lender, 
Irving Tiust Co., and the Government out of the money 
to be borrowed with no intention of ever repaying the 
same, and there is no evidence whatsoe!ver to support 
such a finding, especially as to Locke. :Moreover, the 
law of Utah, and elsewhere, is that fraud is never pre-
sumed, but must be proved in every case by clear and 
convincing evidence. 
Lane V. Peterson, 68 rtah 585, 251 Pac. 37 4; 
Rawson v. Handy, 88 Utah 131; 408 Pac. 2nd, 
473, -l-79. 
Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 Utah 15, 47 
P.ac. 2nd 524; 
37 C. J. 8. "Fraud" section 94; 
Ibid, section 114. 
On the contrary, a lawful, proper and effective in-
tention and contract n1ust, under familiar rules, be pre-
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sumed and applied in the absence, as here, of clear and 
convincing evidence to the contrary. 
The Court also says that it is inconceivable that 
Schnitzer intended Locke to be paid a bonus out of inter-
company profits computed from income paid in part out 
of his own contributed equity funds. Why~ Employers 
frequently pay bonuses to employees with good and 
profitable ideas. Besides, Locke would get as bonus only 
what he already owned as co-venturer under the August 
29th agreement, and Schnitzer the millionaire, would 
acquire Locke's former half interest in the expected tax-
free rentals-a great inducement. 
Surely this is both conceivable and logi0al, and 
Schnitzer had to leave in his 10o/o equity .anyway, under 
the law. It went out first in contract payments under the 
regulations. 
Finally, the Court assumes and states that the 
August 29th agreement contemplated profits out of 
borrowed money-"moneys received from the Govern-
ment for such construction"~and argues therefrom that 
the parties therefore intended the s.ame basis for pr.ofit 
in the October 4th contract. The premise is false. If the 
Court will re-read the August 29th agreement, it will 
be very clear that all it does in this regard is to guarantee 
Schnitzer a profit "off the top" which is "equal'' to 10% 
of monies received from the Government. A guarantee 
of a profit "equal" to 10% of the mortgage (if that is 
what was intended, as no money ever was intended to be 
actually received "from the government") is quite a 
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different thing frmn profits ureceived O'ltt of" monies 
from the Government. 
The Court erred in holding that borrowed mortgage 
money was intended to be the income basis of "profit 
earned by Harsh." It should, in common justice correct 
that error. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT NET RENTAL 
INCOME DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PERIOD IS NOT 
TO BE INCLUDED AS REVENUE IN COMPUTING PROFITS 
EARNED IN CONNECTION WITH THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE PROJECT; 
Although this Court, in setting forth what it con-
sidered to be the proper formula for computing Locke's 
bonus, in its decision did include as a part of income the 
net rental receipts during the construction period of 
$165,986.49, the Court further stated "nor can we agree 
with the trial court that Locke was entitled to share in 
any rentals." 
It is submitted that the trial court in its findings of 
fact did properly include as construction income in de-
termining the profits to be divided between the parties, 
the amount of $165,986.49 received as rentals during 
the construction period. This is supported unequivocally 
by the testimony and re·cords presented to the trial court. 
Although it is admittedly true that under the terms 
of the October 4th agreement Locke had no interest in or 
to the ownership or management of the projects, it is also 
true that Locke's interest by the terms and conditions 
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of said agreen1ent was "limited to the construction of said 
9 projects or any of the1n as in the manner hereinabove 
set forth." A distinction was properly made by the trial 
court as to the construction period involved in its inter-
pretation of the October 4th agreement. The construc-
tion period pertaining to the Hill Field Air Force Base 
project was a period of 24 months, beginning on July 21st 
of 1952 and terminating in July of 1954. This was sub-
stantiated by the testimony of Harold J. Schnitzer (T. 
119-120). It w.as further substantiated by the terms and 
conditions of the "lump sum" construction contract (Ex-
hibit 61) which allowed a period of 24 months to build 
said project. The com1nitment for mortgage insurance 
(Exhibit 186) likewise establishes this 24-month period 
by determining when the amortiz,ation of the mortgage 
itself shall commence at ~a time 24 months after the con-
struction is to start. The mortgage executed by Harsh 
Utah Corporation (Exhibit 63) and the Building & Loan 
Agreement (Exhibit 64) again clearly set forth the 24-
month period. 
The above mentioned documents and other evidence 
contained in the record before the trial court clearly 
establish that Locke's interest in the construction of this 
projeet continued for the full construction period of 24 
months. According to the above set forth documents the 
owner-manager, Harsh Utah Corporation, was not re-
quired to amortize or make payments on the mortgage 
until the end of the said 24-month period, and as a 
matter of actual fact, IIarsh Utah Corporation did not 
fully take over owner-manager responsibility nor was 
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the project finally accepted by the United States Govern-
ment and a final mortgage executed by Harsh Utah Cor-
poration as mortgagor until January of 1955. 
Hespondent Locke testified that there was an agree-
ment between himself and Appellant Schnitzer to the 
effect that income from rentals during the above men-
tioned 24-month period of construction would be included 
in computing Locke's interest under the contract of 
October -±, 1951 (T. 42-.M-~-5-l\I, 797). It is certainly not 
reasonable to believe or to conceive that Locke as Gen-
eral Com;truction Superintendent would have expended 
large sums of money for overtime on these projects with-
out the compensating factor of rental income in mind. By 
this subsequent agreement the Contract of October 4th 
U'as modified to the extent of the constnwtion period 
rentals. 
During the course of the trial documentary exhibits 
were introduced to support the fact that Harold J. 
Schnitzer himself cle~arly intended that rental incmne 
should be used to defray construction expenses. This 
Court's attention is directed to the letters, Exhibits 181, 
184, 185, 213, 231, 233 and 238. When read and understood, 
and read against the background of the relationship be-
tween the various corporations, (to wit; Harsh Montana 
as owner in ~fontana, Harsh Construction Co. as the con-
tractor in :Montana; Harsh Utah as the owner in Utah 
and Harsh Investment Corporation as the contractor in 
Ptah; and Harsh California, the owner in California, 
and Harsh Construction Co. again the contracting organi-
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z.ation in California) and considered in the light of the 
testimony of Mr. Schnitzer as to the relationships being 
identical between these various corporations (T. 119, 
120), these lette-rs most clearly and definitely sustain the 
trial Court'·s Findings of Fact pertaining to this rental 
income. 
Ex. 185 is a letter from Harsh Utah Corporation 
signed by Mr. Schnitzer which says, in part, "Lack of 
rental income from completed units, which income was 
anticipated by sponsor to defray construction costs on 
the original bid" is clear and convincing evidence as to 
the intent of Mr. S.chnitzer, although some of the oral 
testimony on his behalf may have been to the contrary. 
The evidence before the trial Court, taken in its 
entirety, from various places in the transcript and from 
documentary evidence submitted, clearly established a 
construction period pertaining to the Hill Field Air 
Force Base Housing Project of 24 months and it was this 
construction period in which Mr. Locke had a direct 
interest under the terms .and conditions of the October 
4th, 1951 agreement. The documentary evidence herein-
above quoted and set forth clearly shows that it was the 
intent of Schnitzer to defray construction costs by rental 
receipts. The evidence further clearly shows that Harsh 
Utah Corporation could not assu1ne its role as owner-
manager of the Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Proj-
ect until such time as it had been completely constructed 
and had been accepted by the Federal Housing Adminis-
tration and the United States Air Force. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted, that there is 
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clear, convincing and unequivocal evidence to support 
the trial Court's Finding that rental income in the amount 
of $165,986.49 during said construction period should 
be properly used in the computation of profits in which 
Locke should participate and there is no evidence and/or 
logical argument upon which this Court can base a proper 
reversal of the trial Court's decision in this regard. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT 
I OF RESPONDENT'S CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING 
TO HOLD THAT THE AMOUNT OF REVENUE FOR THE 
CHANGE ORDER EXTRAS WAS $333,952.55 INSTEAD OF 
$178,672.00. 
It appears from a careful reading of the decision 
of this Court, that, other than to note that the trial 
Court rejected plaintiff's contention as to change orders 
and allowed further income only to the extent that the 
change orders resulted in an increase in the mortgage 
amount rather than the mnount of the contracts for 
change orders between Harsh Investment Corporation 
and Harsh Ftah Corporation, this Court did not con-
cern itself with the matters presented by Point I of 
Respondent's brief on cross appeal. 
Respondent submits that the 1 ssue presented by 
Point I of his original brief was presented earnestly 
and in good faith, and that he is entitled to a fair con-
sideration thereof and ruling thereon by this court under 
the provisions of the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 25. 
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Respondent respectfully requests and urges the mem-
bers of this Court to examine carefully the terminology 
of Exs. 164 and 196 which are the change orders them-
selves. Re'spondent subn1its that these documents are a 
contract between Harsh Utah Corporation and Harsh 
Investment Corporation and which, under the terms rmd 
conditions of the plans and specifications which was 
made a part of the Construction Contract-"Lump Sum" 
that the only conclusion that can be lawfully or logically 
be drawn is the consideration that Harsh Investment 
Corporation as the contractor is entitled to receive on 
said change orders the contract price of $333,952.55. 
The facts and law applicable to this issue are quite 
fully argued under Point I of Respondent's brief on 
cross-appeal (original brief, pp. 80 to 87). The argu-
ment under Point I of this brief is also relevant. 
Respondent the.refore will not repeat these facts 
and arguments, but respectfully requests and urges this 
Court to rule on this issue in accord with the law and 
the facts as sub1nitted in Respondent's briefs. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER POINT 
II OF RESPONDENT'S ·CROSS APPEAL AND IN FAILING 
TO HOLD THAT APPELLANTS MAY NOT RECEIVE OUT 
OF CONSTRUCTION PROFITS TEN PERCENT (10%) OF 
THE AMOUNT OF THE BID BEFORE COMPUTING RE-
SPONDENT'S BONUS. 
Respondent again submits, after carefully reading 
this Court's decision, that it is apparent that this Court 
did not consider nor did it determine a very material 
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issue in this matter, as to whether or not, under the 
terms and conditions of the October 4th, 1951 .agreement, 
Harsh was entitled to retain ten percent (10%) of the 
total amount of the bid before computing the bonus to 
which Locke was entitled. 
Appellants attempt to establish that Schnitzer ade-
quately financed the project by a continual process of 
transferring funds from one corporation to another and 
from one project to another as the occasion may require 
or demand. This theory of .appellants is absolutely con-
trary to the rules and regulations of the Federal I-Iousing 
Administration; it is absolutely contrary to the terms and 
conditions of the mortgage and the building and loan 
agreement. It is inconceivable that appellants would 
attempt to assert that it was proper in any manner to 
transfer funds from one project to another. A careful 
analysis by this Court of the facts will lead to only one 
conclusion in this matter. In _Montana, Harsh ~fontana 
borrowed funds from :Manufacturers Trust Company 
with which to assist in the construction of the Montana 
project. In l~ tah, Harsh Utah borrowed from the Irving 
Trust Company funds with which to assist in the con-
struction of this project, and any manipulation of these 
TRPST funds between projects in any manner whatso-
ever would have been in violation of the terms and con-
ditions of the individual mortgages, the commitment for 
mortgage insu:;_·ance and the building and loan agreement 
as well as the F. H. A. rules and regulations. 
Any contention that Locke had knowledge of these 
transfers during the construction of the various projects 
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is not supported by any evidence or the record before the 
trial Court. Locke was the construction superintendent, 
busily engaged in building projects in the states of 
Montana and Utah and did not concern himseH with the 
financial manipulations earried on by Schnitzer during 
the course of construction of the projects. 
Appellants would urge in their reply brief that 
Ex. 195 as submitted on behalf of appellants was never 
controverted or attacked and attempt to set this up as an 
accounting for funds on Hill Field Air Force Base. The 
testimony of Mr. Ellis, the accountant for the various 
Harsh companies, clearly shows that this is not true and 
that the sum of $1,040,505.00 was expended by Harsh 
Investment Corporation during the construction of the 
Hill Field Air Force Base Housing Project on activities 
of various Schnitzer corporations other than the Hill 
Field Project (T. 475). As a result, the owner never 
has paid the contractor the lump-su1n contract price, or 
the amounts due it under the "change order" contra,cts. 
As has been demonstrated, it was from these pay-
ments to the contractor that the construction profit and 
Locke's bonus is to be computed and paid. As the trial 
court found, Sehnitzer did not perform his obligation to 
finance the project, and hence has never earned his 
"finance fee." 
Respondent did not, prior to this Court's decision, 
file a reply to the "Reply Brief of Appellants," although 
the reply brief of said appellants contains many argu-
ments and statements which cannot in any manner what-
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soever be supported by the evidence and the record. 
Respondent asSIUIIled and still assumes that this Cour.t 
would disregard the arguments therein contained that 
were not supported by the evidence before the trial 
court. 
Respondent will not reiterate his theory and argu-
ment on this point, which are presented on pages 87 to 
109 of his original brief. However, Respondent does 
respectfully request and again urges this Court carefully 
to consider and rule upon the argument and issue there 
submitted. 
Respondent is confident, and respectfully submits 
that such careful consideration will result in a ruling in 
Respondent's favor on this issue. 
CONCLUSION 
As stated at the outset, each member of this Court 
is entitled to and has our sympathy when he is confronted 
with the task of sifting the truth out of this voluminous 
record, encumbered as it is with the lies, the evasions, 
the half-truths, and the plausible inventions of the intel-
lectual perjurer Schnitzer-but the duty, in the service 
o.f justice, is inescapable and non-delegable. 
The Appellant's late-filed reply brief (which so 
peculiarly and markedly differs in style and presenta-
tion from his original brief) seems to have influenced 
greatly the Court's opinion. It is earnestly submitted, 
however, that most, if not all, of the assertions which 
found their way from this brief into the Court's opinion 
are erroneous and contrary to the trial court's proper 
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findings and the evidence. An example is the character-
ization of anticipated rental profits as "entirely fictitious, 
speculative and uncertain" - and yet, as the court also 
observes, neither party "planned on losing any money"! 
And in fact those profits were reasonably expected io net 
millions over the years, as shown above in the sample 
tabulation of tax-free rental profits. And this is only 
one san1ple of many. The Court's mistaken statement 
that Locke's attorney drafted the key agreement is an-
other and terribly important one. 
The Court has been misled by Schnitzer's plausible 
inventions, and, it is very respectfully submitted, the 
members of the Court have a duty now to check every 
fact and concept against the record and to correct its 
misapprehensions-an admittedly difficult but not im-
possible task. 
Respondent is confident that when this is done the 
Court will withdraw its present opinion and decision, 
mod.ify the judgment as prayed in Respondent's cross-
appeal, and affirn1 the lower court's judgment as so 
modified. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JOHN M. SHERMAN 
212 California Bank Building 
Pasadena, California 
YOUNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
1018 First Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent, 
Alvin T. Locke 
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1 yr. 
2 yrs. 
3 yrs. 
4 yrs. 
5 yrs. 
6 yrs. 
7 yrs. 
8 yrs. 
9 ym. 
10 yrs. 
1. 
ANNUAL 
INCOME 
$318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
318,651 
APPENDIX I 
Illustrativ.e Computation of Expected Rental Profits: 
First 10 Years 
2. 3. 
ANNUAL ANNUAL 
OPERATING & RESERVE 
MAINTENANCE FOR 
EXPENSE REPLACEMENT 
$81,362 $16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
81,362 16,710 
.... 81,362 16,710 
4. 
ANNUAL 
TAXES 
$30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
30,612 
5. 
ANNUAL 
DEBT 
SERVICE 
INCLUDING 
PAYMENT OF 
PRINCIPAL & 
INTEREST 
$167,430 
164,083 
160,736 
157,389 
154,042 
150,695 
147,348 
144,001 
140,654 
137,307 
6. 
NET ANNUAL 
PROFIT AT 
93% 
OCCUPANCY 
(Guaranteed) 
$ 22,537 
25,884 
29,231 
32,578 
35,925 
39,272 
42,619 
45,966 
49,313 
52,660 
TOTAL MINIMUM NET, TAX-FREE INCOME FOR TEN YEARS ____ $375,985 
7. 
NET ANNUAL 
PROFIT AT 
100% 
OCCUPANCY 
(,) 
$ 46,522 
49,869 
53,216 
56,563 
59,910 
63,25'2 
66,604 
69,951 
73,298 
76,645 
$615,830 
(*) At 100% occupancy the income in Column 1 would be increased by the difference that Column 7 
exceeds ·Column 6. (Izakson's testimony at time of trial was that Hill Field Air Force Base 
Housing Project was 100% occupied.) 
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APPENDIX II 
Excerpt from Report No. 1890, 84th Cong-ress, 2nd Session, 
House of Representatives 
"TITLE VIII (Wherry Housing) 
"The history of the so-called Wherry housing 
program is well-known and needs no repeHtion 
here. It was embarked upon when it appeared 
that it provided the only feasible method for pro-
viding mu0h-needed family housing for our mili-
tary personnel. It served a useful purpose. In 
the committee's opin1on, however, the time has 
come when this unusually expensive program 
must be reviewed and action taken which will 
eliminate costs which are wholly unnecessary. 
"With the foregoing thoughts in mind, the 
committee inserted a new section 419 which would 
pernrit the purchase by the Government of 
Wherry housing projects. The savings to be ef-
fected are so large that it would be an unreason-
able man indeed who would deny the wisdom of 
embarking upon this program of purchase. Brief-
ly stated, a Wherry owner or sponsor holds a 
le:ase for 50 or 75 years from the Government 
which gives him the right to future income for the 
period of his lease. When one considers tha;t thP 
housing unit involved cost less than $9,000 to con-
struct, and that the average housing allowance is 
$90 a month or $1,080 a year, it is clear that the 
Government will spend exorbitant sums prior to 
the time that it will have possession of the house. 
For exmnple, the Congress will be appropriating 
housing allowance at the average rate of $l.ORO 
per year per unit for either 50 or 75 years. For 
those leases which cover 50 years, the cost to the 
Government for the $9,000 unit will be $54,000. 
ii 
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The cost to the Goverrunent for the 75-year lease 
unit will be $81,000. There are ·today approxi-
mately 82,000 \Yherry units. One needs but to 
multiply 82,000 times $54,000 to conclude that 
prompt and aggressive action of the kind contem-
plated by this section must be taken." 
APPENDIX III 
Section 512, National Housing Act of 1956 
"ACQUISITION OlT WHERRY ACT HOUSING 
"SEC. 512. Section 404 of the Housing 
Amendments of 1955 is amended to read as fol-
lows: 
'SEC. 404 (a). vVhenever the Secretary of 
Defense or his designee deems it necessary for 
the purpose of this title, he may acquire by pur-
chase, donation, condemnation, or nther means 
of transfer, any land or (with the approval of the 
Federal Housing Commissioner) any housing fi-
nanced with mortgages insured under the provi-
sions of title VIII of the National Housing Act 
as in effect prior to the enactment of the I-Iousing 
Amendments of 1955. The purchase price of any 
such housing shall not exceed the Federal Housing 
Commissioner's estimate of the replacement cost 
of su.ch housing and related property (not in-
cluding the value of any improvements installed 
or constructed with appropriated funds) as of the 
date of final endorsement for mortgage insurance 
redtttced by an appropriate allowance for physical 
depreciation as determined by the Secretary of 
Defense or his designee upon the advice of the 
Commissioner: Provided, That in .any cas·e where 
the Secretary or his designee acquires a projeCJt 
held by the Commissioner, the price paid shall not 
exceed the face value of the ilebentnre~ (plus ae-
crued interest thereon) which the Commissioner 
issued in acquiring such project.'" 
iii 
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